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This study investigates the endogenous determination of firm efficiency and leverage 
while testing the competing hypotheses of agency cost, efficiency-risk and franchise-value, in 
a sample of 136 non-financial firms listed on the Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX), over the 
period 2002 to 2012. Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) method is employed to measure firm 
efficiency as proxy for firm performance. The endogenous nature of firm efficiency and 
leverage allowed using two-stage least square (2SLS) technique. The findings of the efficiency 
equation suggest that leverage has a significant positive effect on firm efficiency. Additionally, 
firm risk, growth rate, size, board size and board composition positively affect firm efficiency. 
On the other hand, the results of the leverage equation suggest that firm efficiency has a 
significant negative effect on leverage. Firm size and CEO duality have positive effects on 
leverage while firm age, board composition, institutional ownership, managerial ownership 
and asset tangibility have negative effects on leverage. Generally, the results support agency 
cost and franchise-value hypotheses that higher leverage improves firm efficiency while higher 
firm efficiency results in reduced leverage. 
Keywords: Leverage, Firm Efficiency, Capital Structure, Firm Performance,    
Data Envelopment Analysis 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued that managers are guardians of their 
shareholders’ interests and they strive to maximise the firm’s value.  An agency problem, 
however, arises if managers serve their own interest instead of shareholders’. Adam 
Smith (1776) argued that multiple and diverse ownerships result in reduced performance 
of the firms as the manager of a firm may not look after the firm’s operations with the 
same motivation as that of its owners. This insight became the basis and motivation for 
the work of Jensen and Meckling (1976) that resulted in abundant research work on 
corporate financing, in the context of agency theory. Within the principal-agent 
framework, the agency theory predicts that the agent tries to benefit from firm’s resources 
and consequently the firm incurs cost which eventually reduces the firm value. On the 
other hand, the principal tries to reduce the possibility of incurring those costs by 
establishing various mechanisms. The agency theory provides a basis for studying 
contractual relationship between managers and shareholders. Both are considered as 
individuals maximising their own utility. Thus, shareholders use certain mechanisms that 
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will lead to reduction in the agency costs. One such mechanism is the use of leverage in 
the capital structure of a firm.  
The agency theory proposes that the choice of debt/equity mix helps in mitigating 
agency costs [Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006)]. Higher leverage can reduce agency 
costs but it may increase bankruptcy costs. Higher leverage may force managers to 
enhance firm performance by generating additional gains to support debt holders [Jensen 
(1986)]. Jensen and Meckling (1976) discussed that at a lower level of debt ratio, the 
agency costs positively affect firm performance and decrease total agency costs, while 
bankruptcy is likely when the leverage reaches a certain level and the costs of outside 
debt may be higher than the outside equity, resulting in higher total agency costs. Risk of 
default may result in conflict between debt holder and shareholder. Myers (1977) termed 
it as ‘underinvestment’ which may result in increased risky financing by the managers. 
Leibenstein (1966) debated on the firm value by assuming the actual and expected 
output in terms of performance measured as efficiency. He noted that how difference in 
interests of the manager and shareholder results in an inefficiency of the firm. The work 
of Leibenstein (1966) is said to be in line with the view of employing leverage as an 
agency-cost mitigating device and importance of these costs in attaining the firm’s 
optimal capital structure [Jensen and Meckling (1976); Myers (1977)]. Extant literature 
lacks evidence on the proxies for measuring performance of the firms which are in line 
with the definition of agency costs [Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006)]. 
In view of the above discussion, this study considers diverse characteristics of the 
firm to determine firm efficiency, in order to observe the implicit effects on the firm 
value. The aim is to establish the best-practice frontier of efficient firms and other 
inefficient firms as a distance from the frontier. The efficiency of the firms allows for 
examining its effects on the capital structure, by testing two hypotheses i.e. efficiency-
risk and franchise value. The former is concerned with employing higher leverage in the 
capital structure as higher efficiency allows decreasing the costs associated with the 
leverage. The latter is concerned with choosing lower leverage as to preserve the benefits 
of higher efficiency and avoid possible bankruptcy [Margaritis and Psillaki (2007)]. 
The main objective of this study is to examine the endogenous role of leverage and 
firm efficiency by using an alternative measure of profit efficiency i.e. Data Envelopment 
Analysis. In doing so, we test several hypotheses of agency theory which are discussed in the 
preceding paragraphs. Moreover, we account for the problem of endogeneity by estimating 
two-stage least square (2SLS) regression and model the relationship between various 
variables, in a manner that is consistent with the suggestions of Margaritis and Psillaki (2007). 
As opposed to previous studies, this study uses DEA which excludes the factors 
not related to agency costs [Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006)]. We expect that this 
study will enable local and foreign firms to have information about the corporate 
environment in terms of efficiency of the firms in Pakistan. Moreover, this study also 
shows  how principal-agent problems can be minimised to enhance firm performance. In 
other words, this study is based on the competing hypotheses of agency cost, efficiency-
risk and franchise-value. The study contributes to the literature in the following ways: 
first, we employ latest measures of efficiency as opposed to the traditional measures of 
firm performance; second, we assess whether the gap between the efficient frontier and 
other frontiers is a basis of choosing debt over equity or vice-versa. 
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The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the literature 
review focusing in particular on different aspects of corporate financing including 
performance of the firm. Section 3 presents details about research methodology and 
methods for collection and analysis of the data. Section 4 spells out findings and 
interpretation of the data analysed. Section 5 concludes the discussion.  
 
2.  RELATED LITERATURE 
The relevance of capital structure to firm’s output efficiency can be explained in 
terms of the agency theory. Since managers are expected to maximise their own utility 
rather than increasing the firm value; shareholders need to use mechanisms that can force 
managers to maximise the firm value. One such mechanism might be the use of debt-
financing. For example, Jensen (1986) argued that firms with excessive free cash flows 
are exposed to the risk of sub-optimal utilisation of these cash flows at the hands of 
managers. Therefore, if shareholders force a higher leverage ratio, then the firm will use 
cash  for debt-servicing. This will limit the sub-optimal utilisation of the free cash flows. 
Below, we first discuss the agency problems and then focus on how  such problems can 
be solved using leverage.  
 
2.1.  Agency Problems 
The first agency problem ‘lack of interest’ was identified by Smith (1776). He 
discussed that managers could not be expected to look after the operations of a business 
with the same interest and vigilance as the business owners. Berle and Means (1932) 
added to Smith’s idea and argued that dispersed ownership has negative implications for 
firm value. Dispersed ownership extends supreme authority to the management to control 
the affairs of the firm. This creates a situation of opportunism for the managers to extract 
rents. They suggested concentrated ownership as an alternative to the dispersed 
ownership, in which case the managers cannot expropriate wealth away from 
shareholders. Later on, Jensen and Meckling (1976) highlighted the agency costs of 
equity.  
Agency theory can solve two problems; risk sharing i.e. the difference in attitudes 
of two parties towards risk and agency problem i.e. different goals of two cooperating 
parties. The former problem arises when the agent and principal are aligned to different 
risk-taking choices and it then leads to the second problem i.e. agency problem.  The 
more the number of fixed claimants, receiving a fixed amount, the more funds will be 
used to satisfy their claims. However, the use of more funds results in less retained 
earnings and/or free cash flow which leads to insolvency/illiquidity of the firm  that 
forces the firm to go for external costly financing. 
 
2.2.  Capital Structure and Firm Efficiency 
The area of capital structure and firm efficiency has attracted the attention of 
researchers in recent times. Few notable studies include Weill (2003); Margaritis and 
Psillaki (2007), Margaritis and Psillaki (2010), Cheng, et al. (2011) and Dawar (2014).  
Margaritis and Psillaki (2007, 2010) employed firm efficiency as a proxy for firm 
performance. They investigated the possibility whether firms can produce more output(s) 
with less input(s) in the presence of debt financing. They argued that the capital structure 
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plays a crucial role in determining the firm efficiency. The linkage between these two 
variables can be studied through agency theory. It refers to the conflicts based on 
interests between the managers, creditors and shareholders. Grossman and Hart (1982) 
argued that in the presence of little or no leverage, managers do not face much stress if 
they produce poor financial results.  On the other hand, if the risk of default is high, it can 
motivate managers to work hard and increase efficiency to avoid bankruptcy. Recent 
papers provide support for the above argument. For example, Shah, Shah, Smith, and 
Labianca (2017) reported that managers perceive higher leverage in the presence of more 
efficient judicial systems as a serious threat to the continuation of their jobs or private 
benefits. In other words, debt financing can discipline managers which can result in better 
performance. Therefore external financing, including debt financing may restrict the 
manager’s opportunism and discretion [Jensen (1986)]. The idea is to subject managers to 
the scrutiny of external capital markets, reduce the free cash flows under the discretion of 
the mangers, and put managers under constant pressure of regular payment of debt 
financing. Resultantly, it is expected that leverage will increase a firm’s efficiency.  
 
2.3.  Control Variables 
There are several control variables which may affect firm performance other than 
leverage. The following variables are most commonly used in studies of capital structure. 
 
2.3.1.  Ownership Pattern and Efficiency 
The extant literature shows that agency problems can be controlled by changing 
the ownership structure of firm. For example, Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggested that 
agency problems can be reduced by increasing the ownership stake of managers. 
However, La Porta, et al. (2001) argued that insiders with significant shareholdings can 
easily expropriate minority shareholders. Similarly, Demsetz (1983) showed that 
increasing managerial ownership in the firm can invite the adverse impact of managerial 
entrenchment. On the link between ownership structure and firm performance, Shleifer 
and Vishny (1986) suggested that large shareholders can reduce agency costs as these 
shareholders can better monitor and discipline managers.  
 
2.3.2.  Asset Structure  
Asset structure plays a key role in determining corporate financing. Compared to 
growth opportunities, tangible assets have more stable value at the time of default and 
hence are more useful to creditors [Titman and Wessels (1988)]. Firms with higher asset 
tangibility are expected to acquire more debt due to the ability to acquire debt at lower 
interest cost, considering that debt is backed by the assets. Shyam-Sunder and Myers 
(1999) showed that leverage and tangibility are positively associated. Several studies 
from Pakistan report similar association.  
 
2.3.3.  Firm Size  
Larger firms are said to be less vulnerable to risk due to their diversification and 
resource endowments. Diversified product portfolio helps them to have a stable flow of 
funds which in turn helps in neutralising the possible negative effect of debt on the firm. 
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This factor gives larger firms an upper hand over smaller ones to easily acquire the debt 
directly or through collateral. Further, the creditors are expected to extend credit to larger 
firms as the recovery chances are high [Hall, et al. (2004)].  
The size factor can influence the firm profitability as well, which in turn allows 
larger firms to choose the levels of internal and external financing. Furthermore, larger 
firms enjoy better economies of scale, can use advanced technology, spend well on 
research and development and attract and maintain qualified employees. These factors 
help larger firms to be more profitable over a longer period. Abdullah, Shah, and Khan 
(2012) used a sample of 183 firms listed at the Pakistan Stock Exchange over the period 
2003 to 2008 and found that firm size has a positive effect on return on assets (ROA), an 
accounting-based measure of firm performance.  
 
2.3.4.  Firm Age  
The survival of a firm in the market over a long period confirms that the firm has 
developed a reputation in the market. The experienced  and reputed firms are expected to 
have easy access to external finance. This also attracts external monitoring of the firm 
which reduces the firm agency costs. Therefore, firm’s age is expected to have a positive 
association with leverage and firm performance [Hall, et al., (2004)]. For a sample of 
PSX listed firms, Shah, Khan, and Afraz (2017) found that the implied cost of equity ( an 
indication of the business risk of a firm) decreases as a firm passes through different 
stages of its life cycle, such as growth, maturity and stagnancy.  
 
2.3.5.  Board Size  
The extant literature reports mixed evidence on the effectiveness of board size in 
reducing agency problems. Several studies report that larger boards can devote more time 
to monitoring managers’ activities, can bring in diverse experience and knowledge 
[Bacon (1973); Herman (1981)], and can effectively allocate workload among board 
members. Singh and Davidson (2003) reported that larger boards are negatively 
associated with asset utilisation. However, they do not contain managerial expenses. This 
implies that larger boards fail to effectively monitor and control agency costs.  
 
2.4.  Institutional Investors and Capital Structure 
Small shareholders own a small chunk of shares of the firm and may not be 
motivated to look after the day-to-day operations of the firm. They may not have the 
resources i.e. time, skill and willingness to monitor the managers of the firm. This leads 
to a problem which is commonly known as free rider problem [Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997)]. Small investors are considered to accept whatever the firm offers them. 
Additionally, any initiative by the small investors cannot solely go in their favour, as non-
small investors with a stake and interest in the firm get benefit from it. The presence of 
large investors can overcome this problem as they have financial incentives to oversee 
the management of the firm. Moreover, these shareholders are able to elect board 
members and also can get themselves onto boards to closely monitor managers of the 
firm. The internal boards are expected to work and deliver in an acceptable manner when 
there is a presence of outside control [Denis, Denis, and Sarin (1997)]. Thus, the purchase 
of shares in bulk by the outsiders can act as a threat to discipline the management. The 
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performance of the managers produces turnovers and maximises the firm value in the 
presence of large investors and as a result of increased possibility of a threat of takeover 
[Denis and Denis (1995)]. The large shareholders also pressurise the management to 
avoid financing the projects to diversify the risk, as bulk of their money is at stake in a 
single firm whose diversification does not suit them which yields lower benefits. 
 
3.  DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1.  Data and Sample 
This study uses the financial data of 136 non-financial firms listed on PSX over 
the period 2002 to 2012. The sample is composed of firms with complete available 
information. Moreover, firms that meet the following criteria are included in the sample: 
 A firm is a non-financial firm. 
 A firm does not have negative equities i.e. loss. 
 A firm is not a state-owned firm. 
 A firm has data available for the entire sample period. 
Financial firms are excluded because using leverage does not mean the same for 
non-financial and financial firms. Firms with negative equities are excluded because such 
firms are presumably financially-distressed and their decisions are not normal. State-
owned firms are not included as they have institutional backing in situation of poor 
performance or bankruptcy, which is a clear event of default in terms of agency theory 
whose effect cannot be truly captured on firm performance.  
 
3.2.  Model Specification 
Following the work of Margaritis and Psillaki (2007), DEA is employed to 
develop an efficiency frontier of the efficient firms and to assess other firms compared to 
the frontier. This study employs two equation-based structural models which take reverse 
causality into account, as noted by Margaritis and Psillaki (2007), because capital 
structure and firm performance might affect each other. This also helps us in testing the 
two competing hypotheses; agency cost and efficiency (efficiency-risk and franchise-
value) hypothesis. Additionally, performance is measured using profit efficiency as 
opposed to conventional indicators, by employing DEA which considers benchmarking 
of the firms and excludes the effects that are unrelated to agency costs.  
The final model has the following form: 
FEit  =  αₒ + α1(LEVit) + α2(SVit) + α3(GROWit) + α4(FSIZEit) + α5(FAGEit) + 
                        α6(BSIZEit) +   α7(BCOMPit) + α8(DUALi) + α9(INSTit) + α10(MANGit) + 
                        α11(CIit) + α12(TAit) + α13(DEit)  +  ε1it … … …  (1) 
LEVit  =  βₒ + β1(FEit) + β2(SVit) + β3(GROWit) + β4(FSIZEit) + β5(FAGEit) + 
                β6(BSIZEit) + β7(BCOMPit) + β8(DUALi) + β9(INSTit) + β10(MANGit) + 
                β11(CIit) + β12(TAit) + β13(PRit)  +  β14(Qit)  +  ε2it  … … (2) 
Where FE refers to the measure of firm efficiency (obtained through DEA), and 
LEV is the proportion of debt of the firm. The remaining variables are control variables 
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which are expected to affect the capital structure and firm performance while ε is an error 
term which is assumed to have zero mean and constant variance. 
 
3.3.  Benchmarking Firm Performance 
There exist several methods to determine the firm performance. The most 
commonly used among them is financial ratio analysis. This method outweighs all other 
methods to evaluate firm performance in the empirical literature [Coelli, et al. (2005)]. 
Different types of ratios include liquidity, leverage, profitability, asset turnover and 
dividend ratios. However, there are also drawbacks of using such measures of firm 
performance. There are issues in implementing and assessing the managerial and firm 
performance, using ratio analysis [Avkiran and Rowlands (2008)]. It is difficult to 
evaluate the top performer of the industry and relative comparison of all other firms. So, 
a firm follows its competitors to decide where to operate with lack of any benchmark 
performance of the industry. Moreover, the macroeconomic factors such as inflation may 
affect the firm’s balance sheet in which case the financial analysis using those figures 
needs precision. The financial ratios use absolute numbers with a little margin of error. 
The DEA is considered more useful in measuring firm performance [Berger and 
Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006)]. It is a profit efficiency measure that controls for factors, such as 
market prices which are not in control of the management. Additionally, it is useful in 
giving efficiency scores for each single firm thus enabling a comparison among all firms. 
This method provides a benchmark that allows firms to set out their direction in terms of 
their operations. Profit efficiency i.e. (DEA method) is better than cost efficiency (i.e. SFA 
method) as far as agency theory is concerned, as it focuses particularly on the managers and 
their activities that how effectively they raise funds and minimise costs. Profit efficiency 
focuses on the maximisation of the firm value [Avkiran and Rowlands (2008)]. However, it 
differs from shareholders’ value as part of the decline in the shareholders’ value comes 
from rising agency cost affecting firm value. Profit efficiency is considered a better measure 
due to different interests of  managers and  shareholders. The measured profit of the best 
firm (using profit efficiency) acts as a standard for all other firms in the industry operating 
under the same conditions. This method considers the agency costs and inefficiency of the 
firms compared to efficient firms  operating under the same conditions. The method gauges 
how distinct different firms operate from the best practice firms where  a firm is considered 
as best practice only if the agency costs are minimised. 
 
3.4.  Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
DEA is a non-parametric analysis technique for measuring firm performance. It is 
used to assess the productive efficiency of the firms i.e. decision making units (DMU), 
which are assumed to be similar in terms of their operations as well as the operating 
environment. Efficiency is defined as the ratio of output to input [Farrel (1957)]. The 
greater the output, with a given level of input the greater the efficiency and vice-versa. It 
is termed as absolute or optimum efficiency. A firm is said to be technically efficient if 
the efficiency score equals 1. The difference in the efficiency scores is often because of 
the differences in technology or production process. A value of less than 1 refers to 
inefficiency which is then compared to potential production obtained through the 
analysis. The analysis can be done through statistical (i.e. econometric) and non-
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statistical (i.e. programming). In the former, the output being the dependent variable (Y) 
is the result of some input(s) (X) along with the error term which represents the 
inefficiency. It is a parametric approach which assumes a functional form. In contrast, 
DEA uses input and output data on some variables of the DMU or firms to develop the 
efficient frontier that acts as a benchmark. It calculates the efficiency by taking into 
account the ratio of weighted outputs to inputs [Johnes (2006)].  
It is a useful method as compared to financial ratios due to its capability to take 
several inputs and outputs for each DMU. This results in efficiency scores for each DMU 
which can take value from 0 to 1. This absolute unit of measurement makes it easy to 
compare different DMUs. Like other approaches and models, the DEA method requires 
no specification on part of inputs and outputs to get the efficiency scores and uses the 
traditional measures or firm information as inputs and outputs. The idea is to minimise 
the inputs with given level of outputs or maximise the outputs with given level of inputs. 
The DEA helps to identify good performance firms that become benchmark for others. 
This not only helps the management to know about the area of weakness which can be 
improved but also facilitates investors in  their investment choice.  
Using a concept of relative efficiency, the DEA allows a  comparison of firms 
based on the best-performing firms in the group. The comparison and analysis are done 
by developing an efficiency frontier which includes all the best-performing firms at the 
top while other firms lie below it. The frontier, which is created using traditional ratios, is 
the actual benchmark for the poor-performing firms. They are said to achieve their 
potential output using given inputs in order to approach the efficiency frontier. Those 
poor-performing firms with good liquidity ratios are better enough to approach efficiency 
frontier. On the other hand, the debt ratios can lead firms far from the efficiency frontier. 
The efficiency scores obtained through DEA method are easy to interpret than traditional 
ratios as they bundle several inputs to give a point efficiency score.  
In the efficiency analysis using DEA, Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978) 
established a scale which became the basis for assessing the efficiency of the firms with 
one another. The DEA efficiency analysis can be carried out using cost, scale, allocative 
and technical efficiency ([Coelli, et al. (2005)].  This study uses technical efficiency 
which refers to how well a company translates inputs into outputs. The technical 
efficiency can be split into pure technical (underutilisation of resources) or scale-size 
impact on DMUs. The technical efficiency is measured through Constant Return to Scale 
(CRS), i.e. the output increases with the same amount of input when all firms are 
operating at the same scale. While pure technical scale is measured through Variable 
Return to Scale (VRS), i.e. the output may not change proportionally with a given level 
of input [Banker, Charnes, and Cooper (1984)]. Due to the varied characteristics of the 
sample, this study uses VRS technology to measure technical efficiency. The financial 
performance can be measured using market and/or accounting-based data. Therefore, this 
study employs only accounting-based data which allows for assessing managerial 
performance considering agency theory [Margaritis and Psillaki (2007)]. Moreover, the 
scale efficiency is equal to technical efficiency divided by pure-technical. 
The general equation for the DEA analysis has the following form: 
DEA  ivars  =  ovars,  [if]   [in]    [, rts(crs | vrs | drs | nirs)  ort(in | out) 
          stage(1 | 2)] … … … … … … … (3) 
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where ivars and ovars refer to the input and output variables. Rts refers to return to scale 
i.e. constant returns to scale, variable return to scale, decreasing returns to scale and non-
increasing return to scale. Ort refers to orientation i.e. input-oriented and output-oriented 
DEA. Stage refers to one-stage DEA and two-stage DEA. 
Based on the discussion in the above paragraph, the equation for the DEA analysis, 
assuming VRS employed in this study has the following form: 
DEA  CAP  COS  CL  OE  =  VA  S  E  GP,  rts(vrs)  ort(out)  stage(2) … (4) 
where CAP is capital measured as firm’s annual fixed tangible assets, COS is cost of 
sales for the period, CL is annual current liabilities and OE is annual operating 
expenses. VA is value-added, measured as product of shared price and outstanding 
shares less equity, S is annual sales, E is annual earnings and GP is gross profit for 
the period. 
 
3.5.  Measurement of the Variables 
The variables used in this study along with symbol and measurement are presented 
in Table 3.1. 
 
Table 3.1 
Variable, Symbol and Proxy 
Variable Symbol Proxy 
Firm Leverage LEV Total Debt ÷ Total Assets 
Firm Efficiency FE Efficiency scores via DEA 
Inputs: Capital (CAP), Cost of sales (COS), 
Current liabilities (CL), Operating expenses 
(OE) Outputs: Value-added (VA), Sales (S), 
Earnings (E), Gross profit (GP) 
Firm Risk SV Standard deviation of earnings before tax 
Growth Opportunities GROW Annual percentage change in the earnings 
Firm Size FSIZE Logarithm of the firm’s sales 
Firm Age FAGE Number of operational years of the firm 
Board Size BSIZE Logarithm of number of members on the 
board 
Board Composition BCOMP Number of external members ÷ Total 
members 
Chair Duality DUAL Dummy – 1 if CEO is Chairman, 0 otherwise 
Institutional Ownership INST Shares owned by Institutions ÷ Total shares 
Managerial Ownership MANG Shares owned by Managers ÷ Total shares 
Market Power CI Firm sales ÷ Industry Sales  
Asset Tangibility TA Proportion of net fixed assets to total assets 
Profitability PR Earnings before interest & tax ÷ total assets 
Instruments   
For Leverage (Debt/Equity) DE Total Debt ÷ Total Equity 
For Efficiency (Tobin Q) Q (Book value of debt + Market value of equity) 
/ Book value of assets  
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3.6.  Testing for Endogeneity 
Endogeneity refers to the problem when the econometric model includes an 
exogenous variable which is endogenous in nature and correlated with the error term 
[Semykina and Wooldridge (2010)]. According to Semykina and Wooldridge (2010), the 
OLS estimates of the parameters are not unbiased as long as the correlation of variable X 
and error term ε is not equal to zero. In this study, we use the test proposed by Hausman 
(1978) to check whether leverage and firm performance are jointly determined. In case if 
there is endogeneity problem then the OLS method yields biased estimates and a method 
known as  two-stage least square (2SLS) will be used to get unbiased estimates of the 
parameters. The test assesses whether the estimates of OLS and 2SLS differ from one 
another and statistically significant. If the estimates differ then it can be inferred that the 
leverage and firm performance are endogenous. Based on the test results, we find that the 
appropriate model estimates are obtained using 2SLS method. 
 
3.7.  Marginal Effect for Efficiency and Leverage 
The marginal effect (ME) of variable Y refers to its rate of change with respect to 
variable X. It is computed for a given variable by assuming that all other variables are 
held constant [Bartus (2005)]. In the linear regression model, the ME equals the relevant 
slope coefficient. The estimated marginal effect is the average of the ME at every data 
point.  We use ME for observing the mean effects of firm efficiency and leverage. In 
addition, we also assess that how different variables affect firm efficiency at different 
levels of leverage and vice-versa.  
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
This section discusses the results concerning leverage and firm efficiency. 
 
4.1.  Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4.1 provides the descriptive statistics of the sample firms. The mean 
leverage is 0.528 which shows that on average firms have employed more leverage than 
equity in their capital structures. The standard deviation of 0.19 indicates deviation of the 
firm leverage from the mean value. The minimum and maximum values for firm leverage 
are 0.03 and 0.97 respectively. Firm risk has a mean of 0.04, showing that the firm’s 
earnings do not vary much across the sample with minimum and maximum value of 
0.001 and 0.56 respectively. The mean for the firm growth is 0.247 with a standard 
deviation of 4.59. The statistic of firm risk and growth exhibits clustered earnings in 
terms of risk but varied earnings in terms of growth of the firms. The firm size has a 
mean of 7.97 with minimum and maximum of 4 and 12 respectively. The average of firm 
age is 32.4 with a large standard deviation of 16.3, confirming that age varies across the 
sample as both newer and older firms are included in the sample, while minimum and 
maximum age is 6 and 52 years, respectively. The board composition shows that on 
average only 0.257 of external members are on the boards. The dummy variable ‘duality’ 
shows that on average 0.221 of the CEOs also act as chairman of the board. Both the 
institutional and managerial ownerships have a mean value of 0.37 and 0.30, respectively. 
The average of 0.10 for market power confirms that firms have minimal power in the 
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market which can be regarded as almost competitive. Firms have 0.467 of the assets in 
the form of fixed tangible assets and 0.533 percent of current assets. The minimum for 
market power and asset tangibility is 0.00 with a maximum of 0.99 and 0.96 respectively. 
The firm’s profitability is only 0.10, meaning 1 rupee of total assets generates on average 





Variable Mean Median Std.Dev. Min Max 
Firm Leverage 0.528 0.548 0.194 0.030 0.978 
Firm Risk 0.049 0.039 0.043 0.001 0.560 
Firm Growth 0.247 0.071 4.590 -25.15 146.8 
Firm Size 7.977 7.88 1.391 4.029 12.30 
Firm Age 32.46 28 16.36 6 52 
Board Size 2.074 2.07 0.178 1 3 
Board Composition 0.257 0.143 0.287 0 0.929 
Duality 0.221 0 0.415 0 1 
Institutional Ownership 0.377 0.338 0.261 0 0.964 
Managerial Ownership 0.307 0.244 0.285 0 0.967 
Market Power 0.104 0.039 0.156 0.000 0.998 
Asset Tangibility 0.467 0.477 0.198 0.001 0.965 
Profitability 0.109 0.094 0.087 -0.445 0.493 
CRS Technical Efficiency 0.822 0.813 0.093 0.473 1 
VRS Technical Efficiency 0.855 0.850 0.097 0.051 1 
Scale Efficiency 0.98 0.963           0.045 0.724 1 
 
Table 4.1 also reports estimates of the mean firm efficiency. Both the efficiency 
estimates using CRS and VRS technology show almost similar mean efficiency score of 
0.82 and 0.85 respectively. When CRS is assumed, it generates 0.47 of the minimum 
efficiency score while 0.05 in case of VRS. The maximum score is 1 for both the CRS 
and VRS. The scale efficiency being the ratio of CRS over VRS is 0.96 which is due to 
the increasing returns to scale as per estimates of the firms with  minimum and maximum 
values of 0.72 and 1, respectively. 
 
4.2.  Efficiency by Firm 
The efficiency measured through VRS technology of each firm is presented in 
Figure 4.1. It shows that seven firms can be termed as technically efficient among all the 
firms which constitutes the efficient frontier. All the remaining firms are inefficient 
considering the efficient frontier. The inefficient firms can improve, based on the slacks 
either to reduce the inputs with the given level of outputs or maximise the outputs with 
the given level of inputs. 
12 Rahim and Shah 
 
Fig. 4.1.  Firm by Efficiency 
 
 
4.3.  Correlation Analysis 
Table 4.2 presents the correlation matrix. The association of FE with LEV, DUAL, 
MANG and TA is negative with LEV having the highest value of –0.50. It has a positive 
relationship with all other variables among which PR is strongly correlated followed by 
FSIZE. Similarly, LEV is positively related with BCOMP, DUAL, MANG while 
negatively with all others with PR being the highest. SV has a low negative correlation 
with FSIZE, FAGE, BSIZE, MANG, CI and TA and low positive correlation with all the 
remaining variables. Likewise, GROW also has a low correlation with all the variables 
with BSIZE, BCOMP, DUAL, INST and CI being negative. FSIZE is strongly correlated 
with CI and has a lowest positive and negative correlation with BCOMP and TA 
respectively. The same is true for FAGE which is negatively correlated with MANG and 
TA while positively correlated with all others. BSIZE and BCOMP have a low negative 
correlation with DUAL, MANG and TA. DUAL is positively correlated with MANG and 
TA while negatively correlated with others. INST is strongly negatively related to 
MANG and also to TA which is also negatively correlated with CI while both CI and PR 
have a negative correlation with MANG. PR is negatively associated with TA.  
 
Table 4.2 
Matrix of Correlation 
 FE LEV SV GROW FSIZE FAGE BSIZE BCOMP DUAL INST MANG CI TA        PR 
FE 1              
LEV -0.50 1             
SV 0.10 -0.17 1            
GROW 0.06 -0.01 0.02 1           
FSIZE 0.42 -0.00 -0.10 0.01 1          
FAGE 0.18 -0.08 -0.03 0.01 0.24 1         
BSIZE 0.24 -0.01 -0.00 -0.02 0.34 0.10 1        
BCOMP 0.10 0.01 0.05 -0.01 0.02 0.05 0.19 1       
DUAL -0.18 0.09 0.00 -0.01 -0.05 0.11 -0.12 -0.11 1      
INST 0.25 -0.18 0.03 -0.00 0.17 0.07 0.21 0.05 -0.14 1     
MANG -0.29 0.16 -0.04 0.03 -0.24 -0.12 -0.22 -0.06 0.17 -0.71 1    
CI 0.36 -0.12 -0.05 -0.00 0.53 0.21 0.33 0.04 -0.12 0.17 -0.28 1   
TA -0.37 -0.10 -0.02 0.02 -0.04 -0.19 -0.00 -0.07 0.08 -0.17 0.25 -0.05 1  











0 50 100 150
Firms
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4.4.  Regression Results for Efficiency 
Table 4.3 reports the results of the Sargan test for validity of the instruments used 
for the endogenous regressors. The p-value suggests that null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected and instruments are valid. 
 
Table 4.3 
Instruments Validity Test 
Sargan test 1.323 
Chi-sq(1) p-value 0.2501 
 
Table 4.4 presents the estimates of the efficiency equation. The ***, **, * shows 
statistical significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, 10 percent levels respectively. The 
equation is estimated using 2SLS technique. The estimates are based on the VRS 
technology of the efficiency as the characteristics of the firms vary across sample such as 
age, size, tangibility of assets etc. Since there is a problem of endogeneity and errors are 
not i.i.d, the 2SLS  is considered to provide  efficient and unbiased estimates as it 
controls for the endogeneity along with robust estimates to correct for the error term.  
The leverage has a significant positive impact on the efficiency. This result 
supports the agency-cost hypothesis that employing debt in the capital structure improves 
firm performance [Margaritis and Psillaki (2007); Zhang and Li (2007)]. The leverage is 
supposed to reduce the excess free cash flow, resulting in less agency costs and improved 
performance [Jensen (1986)]. Leverage also reduces the managerial opportunism which 
results in better firm performance [Warokka and Herrera (2011)]. Myers (2001) noted 
that leverage is also less costly and is coupled with reduced agency costs, which could 
have a positive impact  on firm performance.  
Risky firms are supposed to perform better than others. According to Florackis 
and Ozkan (2008), growth of the firm also enhances firm performance because of the 
disbursement of excess cash flow which reduces the free cash flow. The positive 
effect of size on efficiency suggests that bigger firms have improved performance. 
As mentioned by Titman and Wessels (1988), large firms have the ability to generate 
greater cash flows and acquire the least costly debt, backed by assets, resulting in 
less bankruptcy costs and better performance. Older and larger firms are expected to 
have a good reputation in the market  with considerable market share [Hasan and 
Butt (2009)]. This is consistent with the findings of Hall, et al. (2004) in that the size 
and age of the firm determine the debt raised by a firm. Larger boards and external 
independent members on the board do contribute to firm performance. The variable 
of CEO duality has a statistically insignificant effect on firm performance. The 
existence of institutional investors does not improve efficiency while managers’ 
stake in the firm also reduces firm performance. As mentioned by Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997), the institutions and large shareholders can exploit minority 
shareholder rights because minority may not have enough resources which can lead 
to a free rider problem. Firms with larger share of the market are supposed to 
exercise their power and influence the market, resulting in higher efficiency. 
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Table 4.4 

































The negative r-square indicates that the residual sum of squares is greater than the 
total sum of squares which can happen in 2SLS models; as instruments are used for the 
endogenous regressors to solve the structural model, while the r-square incorporates the 
actual values of the regressors which are different from those used to fit the model. The 
statistical significance of the individual coefficients is important which makes a good fit 
of the model. 
 
4.5.  Regression Results for Leverage 
The test for validity of the instruments is presented in Table 4.5. The insignificant 
p-value does not allow the rejection of the null hypothesis of valid instruments. 
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Table 4.5 
Instruments Validity Test 
Sargan test 2.018 
Chi-sq(1) p-value 0.1555 
 
Table 4.6 presents the estimates for the leverage equation. The efficiency has a 
significant negative effect on leverage. It validates the franchise-value hypothesis that 
higher efficiency discourages the use of debt which can be used for protecting future 
gains. Higher efficiency as a result of higher earnings leads to higher retained earnings 
and lower debt ratio. Although higher efficiency increases firm’s debt capacity but firms 
might not employ debt in the capital structure to avoid possible bankruptcy costs [Berger 
and Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006)]. 
 
Table 4.6 
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The same is true for risk that risky firms prefer equity over debt. Growth and 
market power positively affect leverage while risk and board size are statistically 
insignificant. Large, emerging and newer firms are expected to incur more debt than 
small and older firms. Board composition has a significant negative effect on leverage. 
Again, the institutional investors and managers cannot be the factors in determining debt. 
This is consistent with Warokka and Herrera (2011) that managerial ownership that leads 
to opportunism, being the cost of agency conflicts, may discourage leverage. 
Interestingly, the tangible assets do not help firms to raise debt. Based on the predictions 
of trade-off and agency cost theory, tangible assets are expected to be positively 
associated with leverage while pecking-order theory predicts a negative relationship. It 
also contrasts with Shah and Ilyas (2014), indicating a positive relationship between asset 
structure and leverage. Though, efficiency is negatively related to leverage which can 
cause firms to retain their assets for generating future gains. 
 
4.6.  Marginal Effects for Efficiency 
Table 4.7 provides estimates of the mean effect of variables on efficiency of the 
firm. The findings are obtained from 2SLS method as employed earlier. These are the 
averages of the slopes for each variable with respect to the variable ‘leverage’. The 
results suggest that on average, leverage is negatively associated with efficiency. 
 
Table 4.7 




























Prob > F 
0.767 
0.000 
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The same is true for growth, firm age, board composition and institutional and 
managerial ownership.
1
 Greater risk helps firms to generate earnings. Firm size positively 
affects firm performance and is in line with the previous findings related to Pakistan 
[Latif, Bhatti, and Raheman (2017)]. The size factor is relevant with the view that larger 
firms do better than others in terms of survival while larger board size may ensure less 
exploitation of the resources due to monitoring of the independent members. As opposed 
to the view of agency theory, the CEO duality shows a positive relation with efficiency. 
As expected, market power enhances firm performance. 
The regressions in Table 4.8 assess effects of different variables on firm efficiency 
at ten levels of leverage i.e. 0.05 for 1, 0.15 for 2, 0.25 for 3, 0.35 for 4, 0.45 for 5, 0.55 
for 6, 0.65 for 7, 0.75 for 8, 0.85 for 9 and 0.95 for 10 with their respective p-values. 
Leverage ratio ranges from 0.05 to 0.95. The risk is statistically significant at levels 3, 4 
and 5 and associated positively at low levels of leverage but negatively for highly levered 
firms. This may be caused by the additional risk taken to raise finance which increases 
the chances of financial distress resulting in poor performance. 
 
Table 4.8 
Marginal Effects for Efficiency 
 SV GROW FSIZE 
_at dy/dx P>z dy/dx P>z dy/dx P>z 
1 .2728 0.082 -.0002 0.881 .0465 0.000 
2 .2337 0.059 .0001 0.932 .0509 0.000 
3 .1947 0.035 .0004 0.606 .0553 0.000 
4 .1556 0.016 .0007 0.158 .0597 0.000 
5 .1165 0.012 .0011 0.007 .0640 0.000 
6 .0774 0.123 .0014 0.011 .0684 0.000 
7 .0384 0.598 .0018 0.043 .0728 0.000 
8 -.0006 0.995 .0021 0.085 .0772 0.000 
9 -.0397 0.768 .0024 0.123 .0816 0.000 
10 -.0788 0.638 .0028 0.155 .0859 0.000 
 FAGE BSIZE BCOMP 
_at dy/dx P>z dy/dx P>z dy/dx P>z 
1 -.0036 0.000 1.0411 0.000 -.1055 0.072 
2 -.0035 0.000 1.0379 0.000 -.1072 0.061 
3 -.0033 0.000 1.0346 0.000 -.1089 0.053 
4 -.0032 0.000 1.0314 0.000 -.1105 0.047 
5 -.0031 0.001 1.0282 0.000 -.1122 0.043 
6 -.0030 0.001 1.0249 0.000 -.1139 0.041 
7 -.0028 0.002 1.0217 0.000 -.1156 0.041 
8 -.0027 0.003 1.0184 0.000 -.1173 0.042 
9 -.0026 0.005 1.0152 0.000 -.1190 0.044 
10 -.0025 0.009 1.0119 0.000 -.1207 0.048 
 INST MANG CI 
_at dy/dx P>z dy/dx P>z dy/dx P>z 
1 -1.2131 0.000 -3.0725 0.000 .07557 0.190 
2 -1.2076 0.000 -3.0687 0.000 .06500 0.210 
3 -1.2022 0.000 -3.0649 0.000 .05443 0.250 
4 -1.1967 0.000 -3.0611 0.000 .04386 0.324 
5 -1.1912 0.000 -3.0573 0.000 .03329 0.446 
6 -1.1858 0.000 -3.0535 0.000 .02272 0.614 
7 -1.1803 0.000 -3.0498 0.000 .01214 0.802 
8 -1.1748 0.000 -3.0460 0.000 .00157 0.976 
9 -1.1694 0.000 -3.0422 0.000 -.00899 0.880 
10 -1.1639 0.000 -3.0384 0.000 -.0195 0.768 
 
1The extant literature generally shows that insider-ownership negatively affects firm performance (see 
for example, Ullah, Ali, and Mehmood (2017); Abdullah, Shah, and Khan (2012). 
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On the other hand, the growth variable is significant at levels 5, 6 and 7. Firm size 
and board size remain positive and significant at all levels except at level 1 for growth, 
while firm age, institutional and managerial ownership remain significant and negative at 
all levels. Similarly board composition also has a negative and significant effect at high 
levels of leverage. The effect of market power is also positive till level 8. The 
characteristics of the firm, as measured through the variables, allows inferring that highly 
levered firms generally show poor performance than low levered firms in the presence of 
the variables as discussed.  
 
4.7.  Marginal Effects for Leverage 
The results for marginal effects of leverage regression are presented in Table 4.9.  
 
Table 4.9 






























Prob > F 
0.753 
0.000 
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The average efficiency has significantly negative effect while both risk and growth 
share an insignificantly negative and positive relationship with leverage, respectively. 
Large and newer firms seem to raise more debt financing while firms with large and 
diverse boards have low leverage. CEO duality positively affects leverage while 
institutional, managerial ownership and market power negatively affect it. 
Slopes of the variables with respect to firm leverage at ten levels of efficiency are 
presented in Table 4.10. The levels are represented by value of 1 to 10 for 0.55, 0.60, 
0.65, 0.70, 0.75, 0.80, 0.85, 0.90, 0.95 and 1.00 of efficiency, respectively. The effect of 
risk and growth is positive and negative, respectively but insignificant for all firms 
including technically efficient firms. Firm size remains positive and significant while age, 
board size, composition, institutional and managerial ownership remain negative and 
significant at all levels of efficiency. Market power and asset tangibility also share 
negative relationships with leverage but share significant and insignificant at levels 1 and 
2, respectively. Generally, more efficient firms do not attract higher leverage based on the 
relationship of the variables at levels of efficiency.  
 
Table 4.10 
Marginal Effects for Leverage 
 SV GROW FSIZE 
_at dy/dx P>z dy/dx P>z dy/dx P>z 
1 -.3960 0.222 .00317 0.502 .06744 0.000 
2 -.3404 0.223 .00285 0.485 .06552 0.000 
3 -.2848 0.227 .00253 0.462 .06360 0.000 
4 -.2291 0.235 .00222 0.431 .06168 0.000 
5 -.1735 0.255 .00190 0.385 .05976 0.000 
6 -.1179 0.309 .00158 0.315 .05785 0.000 
7 -.0622 0.483 .00127 0.205 .05593 0.000 
8 -.0066 0.935 .00095 0.106 .05401 0.000 
9 .04896 0.616 .00063 0.372 .05209 0.000 
10 .10460 0.419 .00032 0.792 .05017 0.000 
 FAGE BSIZE BCOMP 
_at dy/dx P>z dy/dx P>z dy/dx P>z 
1 -.0086 0.000 -1.0124 0.002 -.5546 0.000 
2 -.0085 0.000 -.98114 0.003 -.5457 0.000 
3 -.0084 0.000 -.94988 0.003 -.5368 0.000 
4 -.0084 0.000 -.91861 0.004 -.5279 0.000 
5 -.0083 0.000 -.88734 0.005 -.5190 0.000 
6 -.0082 0.000 -.85607 0.007 -.5101 0.000 
7 -.0081 0.000 -.82480 0.010 -.5012 0.000 
8 -.0081 0.000 -.79354 0.014 -.4923 0.000 
9 -.0080 0.000 -.76227 0.020 -.4834 0.000 
10 -.0079 0.000 -.73100 0.029 -.4745 0.000 
 INST MANG CI 
_at dy/dx P>z dy/dx P>z dy/dx P>z 
1 -1.4572 0.000 -2.3530 0.001 -.3906 0.036 
2 -1.4560 0.000 -2.3684 0.000 -.3369 0.044 
3 -1.4548 0.000 -2.3839 0.000 -.2833 0.057 
4 -1.4536 0.000 -2.3993 0.000 -.2296 0.080 
5 -1.4524 0.000 -2.4148 0.000 -.1759 0.123 
6 -1.4512 0.000 -2.4302 0.000 -.1222 0.216 
7 -1.4500 0.000 -2.4457 0.000 -.0686 0.424 
8 -1.4488 0.000 -2.4611 0.000 -.0149 0.845 
9 -1.4476 0.000 -2.4765 0.000 .0387 0.588 
10 -1.4464 0.000 -2.4920 0.000 .0924 0.202 
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 TA 
_at dy/dx P>z 
1 -.1004 0.246 
2 -.1308 0.085 
3 -.1611 0.014 
4 -.1915 0.001 
5 -.2219 0.000 
6 -.2523 0.000 
7 -.2826 0.000 
8 -.3130 0.000 
9 -.3434 0.000 
10 -.3737 0.000 
 
4.8.  Robustness of Results 
In order to reconcile the findings of the two models, namely agency cost and 
leverage, other variables instead of efficiency and leverage are used for robustness check. 
The proxy used for leverage is debt to equity. The results of the efficiency equation are 
given in Table 4.11. Leverage shows a significant positive relationship with efficiency. 
Although risk, firm age, board composition and market power have a negative 
relationship while growth, firm size, board size, duality, institutional and managerial 
ownership confirm the result of the agency cost model. 
 
Table 4.11 
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A similar robustness check is performed for the leverage equation in Table 4.12. 
The proxy used for efficiency is Tobin Q. In contrast to the results of leverage model; the 
efficiency shows a positive association with leverage. The rationale behind this is that 
Tobin Q is a single measure used to assess firm performance, while the efficiency 
employed information on four inputs and four outputs as discussed earlier. In other 
words, DEA uses multiple inputs and outputs to assign weights based on the nature of 
data and measure efficiency. Growth, firm size, age, board size, composition confirms the 
results of the leverage model. 
 
Table 4.12 
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5.  CONCLUSION 
This study examined the endogenous determination of firm efficiency and 
leverage. It used DEA to measure the efficiency of the firm by establishing efficient 
frontier. The analysis was done using a panel data set of 136 non-financial firms listed on 
the PSX over the period 2002-2012. The data supported the fixed effect model instead of 
random effect. The leverage and efficiency were found to be endogenously determined. 
The empirical results obtained through 2SLS method supported agency cost hypothesis 
that leverage is related positively with efficiency. This finding is in line with existing 
evidence from Pakistan [Ullah and Shah (2014)]. The reverse causality from efficiency to 
leverage was also examined by considering efficiency-risk and franchise value 
hypotheses. The results confirmed the prediction of franchise-value hypothesis that 
efficiency shares a negative association with leverage. The earnings generated through 
higher efficiency increase the existing retained earnings resulting in lower debt ratio. 
Efficient firms try to protect their future gains through higher equity capital from possible 
liquidation [Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006)]. 
All the variables have a positive relationship with efficiency except institutional 
and managerial ownership. On the other hand, all the variables have a negative 
relationship with leverage except growth, firm size, CEO and market power. Generally, 
the findings of the study are quite robust. 
The findings of this study are based on VRS technology due to varied 
characteristics of the sample firms. Researchers can consider making a different sample 
of firms with similar characteristics in terms of the variables included in this study such 
as assets, debt, size, age etc. The analysis can be carried out using CRS technology to 
examine how the variables affect firm financing and performance. Similarly, cross-
industry comparison can be done to analyse the differences in results across each 
industry. External factors such as interest rate, technological changes and industry 
specific factors such as risk can also be considered in future studies. It is important to 
mention that the role of corporate governance is of utmost importance in corporate 
finance, especially in the studies of agency theory. So, it can be considered in the future 
studies, particularly the role of large investors in helping firms to resolve the principal-
agent problems to improve firm performance. 
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